Rick Baldassin and Cindy Baldassin v. Jan S. Freeman, MD, PC : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2008
Rick Baldassin and Cindy Baldassin v. Jan S.
Freeman, MD, PC : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Scott A. DuBois; Peter H. Donaldson; Snell and Wilmer; Attorneys for Appellees.
Jeffrey R. Oritt; Bradley M. Strassberg; Cohne, Rappaport and Segal, P.C.; Kay Burningham;
Attorney at Law; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Baldassin v. Freeman, No. 20080390 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/887
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RICK BALDASSIN and CINDY 
BALDASSIN, 
Plaintiffs and . \\>;\ Hants, 
vs. 
JAN S. FREEMAN, M.D. and JAN S. 
FREEMAN. M.D.. P.C, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
Appeal No. 20080390 
Civil No. 060700579 
Appeal from Order of Second District Court 
for Davis County 
Judge Thomas Kay 
Scott A. DuBois 
Peter H. Donaldson 
SNELL & WILMER 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1004 
Attorneys for Appelles 
Jeffrey R. Oritt (Bar No. 2478) 
Bradley M. Strassberg (Bar No. 7994) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
257 East 200 South, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0008 




Kay Burningham (Bar No. 4201) 
Attorney at Law 
9235 Sandtrap Court 
Park City, Utah 84098 
Telephone (435) 649-6786 
Facsimile (435) 649-6796 
Email: kay@kayburningham.com 
Attorneys for Appellants 
) 
. APPELLATE COU-*.. 
AUG 2 7 2QQ8 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RICK BALDASSIN and CINDY 
BALDASSIN, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
JAN S. FREEMAN, M.D. and JAN S. 
FREEMAN, M.D., P.C, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
Appeal No. 20080390 
Civil No. 060700579 
Appeal from Order of Second District Court 
for Davis County 
Judge Thomas Kay 
Scott A. DuBois 
Peter H. Donaldson 
SNELL & WILMER 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1004 
Attorneys for Appelles 
Jeffrey R. Oritt (Bar No. 2478) 
Bradley M. Strassberg (Bar No. 7994) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
257 East 200 South, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0008 




Kay Burningham (Bar No. 4201) 
Attorney at Law 
9235 Sandtrap Court 
Park City, Utah 84098 
Telephone (435) 649-6786 
Facsimile (435) 649-6796 
Email: kav(g),kavburningham.com 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a), Appellants submit the 
following appellate brief. 
Table of Contents 
Table of Authorities 3 
Statement of Jurisdiction 4 
Issues Presented for Review 4-5 
Determinative Statutory Provisions 5 
Statement of the Case 6-10 
Summary of Arguments 10 
Argument 10 
The District Court Improperly Granted Summary Judgment 10 
I. The District Court Improperly Ignored the Material Facts 
Presented by the Baldassins, Which Raised Genuine Issues of Material 
Fact 11 
II. The Facts Presented to the District Court Show that Summary Judgment 
Was Improperly Granted 16 
Conclusion 23-24 
Addendum 26 
I. Rule 7, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
II. Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
III. District Court's Ruling on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
IV. Declaration of Rick Baldassin 
2 
Table of Authorities 
Cases 
Bangerterv. Petty. 2008 UT App 153,11 12, 184P.3d 1249 11 
Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1039 (Utah 1991) 11 
Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1100, 1101 (Utah 1995) 4, 14, 
15,22-23 
Gagner v. Strekouras, All A.2d 1168 (R.I. 1980) 19-20 
Hartv. Bridges, 591 P.2d 1172, 1174(Okl. 1979) 18-19 
HolbrookCo. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975) 13 
Kilpatrickv. Wiley, Rain & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283,1292-93 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996) 4, 14, 15 
Larson v. Wycoff Co., 624 P.2d 1151, 1153 (Utah 1981) 11 
Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, U 19, note 5, 5 P.3d 616 15 
Mandola v. Mariotti, 557 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Ct App.- Houston 1977) 19 
Nunleyv. Westates Casing Servs., Inc., 1999 UT 100, \ 31, 989 P.2d 1077 5 
Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County, 2002 UT 17, \ 24, 42 P.3d 379 15-16, 23 
Rice v. Granite School Dist., 456 P.2d 159, 162-63 (Utah 1969) 16, 17-18, 22 
Sander v. Wright, 394 N.W.2d 896 (S.D. 1986) 19 
Shaw Resources Ltd., L.L.C v. Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell, P.C., 2006 UT App 313, 
1120 142P.3d560 10-11 
Traco Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Comtrol, Inc., 2007 UT App 407, 175 P.3d 572 4 
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Kearl, 896 P.2d 644, 646-7,648 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 5, 11, 
16, 17,22,23 
United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 892 (Utah 
1993) 16-17 
Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983) 13-14 
Whitaker v. Salt Lake City Corp 522 P.2d 1252, 1253 (Utah 1974) 20 
Zaayer v. Edwards, 429 N.E.2d 607 (111. App. Ct. 1981) 20 
Statutes and Rules 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2(a)-3(j)(2008) 4 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7 5, 14-15 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56 5, 15, 22 
3 
Statement of Jurisdiction 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code § 78-2(a)-3(j), as 
this case was poured over from the Utah Supreme Court. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2(a)-3(j). 
Issues Presented For Review 
L When considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court must 
construe all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. In this case, the district 
court adopted the moving party's statement of facts wholesale, failed to consider the 
additional material facts advanced by the Baldassins, which were uncontroverted by Dr. 
Freeman and raised genuine issues of material fact, and failed to construe the facts in a light 
most favorable to the Baldassins. Did the district court incorrectly grant summary judgment 
against the Baldassins? 
This presents an issue of law that is reviewed for correctness. See Traco Steel 
Erectors, Inc. v. Comtrol, Inc., 2007 UT App 407, 175 P.3d 572. Specifically, the question 
presented is whether the district court erred when it failed to construe the facts in a light most 
favorable to the non-moving party, in this case the Baldassins. See Draper City v. Estate of 
Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1995); Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rain & Fielding, 909 P'.2d 
1283,1292-93 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
2. Summary judgment cannot be granted if the record reflects a single issue of 
material fact regarding the invocation of estoppel, and "reasonable reliance" is a question of 
fact. Dr. Freeman admitted his negligence to the Baldassins, and he and his insurer said they 
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would pay the Baldassins' medical expenses and lost income. They did, for a while. The 
Baldassins relied on those statements and actions in not filing suit against Dr. Freeman. Dr. 
Freeman and his insurer stopped all payments only after the statute of limitations had run. 
Did the district court err when it ignored the disputed issue of material fact regarding the 
reasonableness of the Baldassins' reliance on Dr. Freeman's statements and actions and 
granted summary judgment against the Baldassins? 
Whether the district court properly applied the law as to estoppel is a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. SeeNunleyv. Westates Casing Servs., Inc., 1999 UT 100, ^[31, 
989 P.2d 1077 (reviewing trial court's legal conclusions regarding application of estoppel 
doctrine for correctness). In addition, reliance is a question of fact. See, Travelers Insurance 
Co. v. Kearl, 896 P.2d 644, 648 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("In addition, while Travelers has 
argued that Mr. Kearl's conduct could not equate to reasonable reliance, that question is one 
of fact to be determined at trial."). 
Each of these issues were preserved in the district court pursuant to the Baldassins' 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment. See R. 214-92. 
Determinative Statutory Provisions 
The only rules that may be determinative of this appeal are Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 7 and 56. See Utah R. Civ. P. 7, 56. Each of these rules are provided in their 
entirety in the Addendum to this brief. 
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Statement of the Case 
The facts of this case are set forth in the Baldassins' Memorandum in Opposition to 
Motion for Summary Judgment, specifically at R. 217-226, portions of which are quoted 
verbatim herein; citations are to the record: 
Appellant Rick Baldassin ("Rick") entered Intermountain Surgical Center on May 16, 
2003, preparing for a surgical hernia repair that should have lasted less than an hour. R. 217. 
Instead, Rick woke up from surgery, recollecting as follows: "I woke up and the attending 
nurse said that they were now going to take me to LDS Hospital." When he told the nurse 
that his wife was to pick him up, she stated, "Oh, you haven't heard yet? There's been an 
accident, and they're transferring you to LDS Hospital." Id. 
Appellee Dr. Freeman ("Dr. Freeman") then came to see Rick, "and he told me that, 
during the procedure, my colon had been nicked, that he had repaired it, and that he wanted 
to keep me in the hospital for a couple of days on antibiotics to have some tests done and for 
observation." Id. A few days later, Dr. Freeman again came to see Rick, and told Rick that 
he wanted to release him from the hospital. Rick told Dr. Freeman that he did not feel well. 
Dr. Freeman told Rick that he should remain at the hospital another day. Id., 217-18. Rick's 
condition deteriorated, as he suffered severe abdominal pain and began vomiting bile. Due 
to his condition, Rick then had to undergo an exploratory laparotomy on May 22. Id., 218. 
During the following week, while Rick was still at the hospital, Dr. Freeman 
came to his room and sat beside his bed. He told Rick: 
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In a period of time, you're going to be getting a lot of bills as a result of these -
this extended stay and extra surgeries that we've done, and when you get them, 
I want you to collect them all up and bring them to my office, and I'll take care 
of them. 
Id. Rick told Dr. Freeman that he "would do that." Rick then underwent yet another 
surgical procedure on May 28. He was finally released from the hospital on June 11, 2003. 
Id. As of September 2004, Rick was still not feeling well. Dr. Freeman informed him that 
he would need gallbladder surgery. Rick had laparoscopic cholecystectomy surgery 
performed by Dr. Freeman on September 21, 2004. Rick had additional, related surgical 
procedures performed in October 2004, and again in April 2006. Id. 
Rick recalled a conversation he had with Dr. Freeman one year after the 
original surgery: 
A. I said, you know, it's been a year now since we first met, or not since we first 
met, since the first surgery, and he said, Yeah, you have a heck of a scar for a 
hernia. And then he said, I've been doing this for thirty years. I should have 
known better. 
Id, 218-19. 
Rick did not instantly file a lawsuit in this matter, as he reasonably believed that Dr. 
Freeman had admitted liability to him, and was going to pay his bills. 
Q Okay. When did you first believe that Dr. Freeman had been negligent in his 
treatment of you? 
A When he offered to pay. 
Q And when was that? 
A While I was in the hospital in May of 2003. 
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Q And at that point, you were aware that you had a viable lawsuit or that you had 
a potential claim? 
A It didn't really cross my mind. I was more interested in staying alive. 
Q Okay. At some point after your treatment, you were aware that you would 
have had an actionable lawsuit at that point. Weren't you aware of that? 
A Because of the way it was handled at the time, it didn't cross my mind. 
Id, 219. 
In reliance on Dr. Freeman's promise, Rick began collecting his first set of bills and 
expenses. He was told by Dr. Freeman to give them to his malpractice insurance agent, 
Michael Imbler, at Utah Medical Insurance Association ("UMIA"). Id, 219-20. At Dr. 
Freeman's direction, Rick began submitting his first set of bills, expenses and evidence of 
lost wages for himself and his wife, either directly to Dr. Freeman, or to Mr. Imbler, prior to 
August 2004. Such expenses were paid, either to the Baldassins or to the various entities 
owed. Id., 220. 
In reliance on Dr. Freeman's promise, Rick again collected and submitted his second 
set of bills, expenses and lost wages to Mr. Imbler in or about February 2005. Such 
expenses were again paid, either to the Baldassins or to the various entities owed. Id., 221. 
In reliance on Dr. Freeman's promise, Rick again collected and submitted a 
third set of bills, expenses and lost wages to Mr. Imbler in or about December 2005. These 
items were not paid: 
A In December of 2005, and I told [Imbler] that we had yet additional bills and 
claims, and that was when he told me that he was surprised, that he thought 
S 
that I had gotten better, and I told him that that was not the case. And he said 
that he was sorry to hear that and asked me to forward the information to him, 
which I believe we did, either by mail or fax . . . 
I didn't hear from him for several weeks, contacted him again, I believe, in 
January of 2006. He told me that the matter was under review . . . And he said 
that an endocrinologist was going to review the case, and he also, at that point, 
asked us to send to him certain tax returns. I don't remember which ones, but 
whatever they were, I sent them to him. 
I didn't hear from him again for a while. The next conversation I had with 
him, he said that the amount of money that they had paid out to me now 
exceeded the amount that he was authorized to oversee, and that it would have 
to go to another level of committee or something. And I didn't hear anything 
more from him, and I haven't talked to him since. 
Id, 221-22. 
In February 2006, Rick saw Dr. Freeman and attempted to gain his assistance 
with payment of his medical bills and related expenses. No such assistance was offered: 
A. And I also mentioned to [Dr. Freeman] that the people from UMIA were being 
unresponsive to us. And he told me that they didn't feel that my current symptoms 
were related to my previous surgeries, and I asked him if there was anything that he 
could do to try to persuade them and he said, No. 
Id., 222. At that time, two and one half years had passed since Rick's initial surgery. Id. 
The Baldassins filed this medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Freeman on or about 
November 13, 2006. R. 01-07. On January 9, 2008, Dr. Freeman filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment, requesting dismissal on the basis of expiration of the applicable statute 
of limitations. See R. 115-18. The Baldassins opposed this motion, arguing that Dr. 
Freeman should be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations based upon his conduct 
and the conduct of his insurer. See R. 214-92. On April 22, 2008, the district court entered 
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a Ruling, holding as a matter of law that Dr. Freeman was not estopped from asserting the 
statute of limitations. See R. 351-56. The district court entered an Order dismissing the 
Baldassins' case on April 29, 2008. See R. 357-59. The Baldassins timely appealed from 
the Ruling and Order on May 6, 2008. 
Summary of Arguments 
1. When ruling on Dr. Freeman's Motion for Summary Judgment, the district 
court failed to liberally construe the facts in favor of the Baldassins. In fact, the district 
court essentially ignored the facts presented by the Baldassins altogether. This constitutes 
reversible error. 
2. The facts presented to the district court show that genuine issues of material 
fact exist regarding whether Dr. Freeman should be estopped from asserting the applicable 
statute of limitations, precluding summary judgment. 
Argument 
THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
This Court succinctly stated the standard of review regarding a motion tor summary 
judgment in Shaw Resources Ltd., L.L.C. v. Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell, P.C., 2006 UT App 
313, 142P.3d560: 
Summary judgment is appropriate only where "pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with ... affidavits, ... show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
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Id., U 20. &e also Bangerter v. Petty, 2008 UT App 1534 12,184 P.3d 1249 (same); Clover 
v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1039 (Utah 1991) ("... the facts are to be liberally 
construed in favor of the parties opposing the motion, and those parties are to be given the 
benefit of all inferences which might reasonably be drawn from the evidence." (quotations 
and citations omitted)); Larson v. WycoffCo., 624 P.2d 1151, 1153 (Utah 1981) ("Because 
summary judgment is a harsh remedy which deprives a person of a full trial of his case, this 
Court will review the facts in a light most favorable to the party against whom summary 
judgment was granted."). If this Court finds a material factual issue, "we will reverse the 
grant of summary judgment." Travelers Ins. Co. v. Kearl, 896 P.2d 644, 646-47 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995) (citations omitted). 
I. The District Court Improperly Ignored the Material Facts Presented by 
The Baldassins, Which Raised Genuine Issues of Material Fact. 
The district court failed to liberally construe the facts in favor of the Baldassins. 
Indeed, the district court largely ignored the facts presented by the Baldassins altogether. In 
doing so, it thwarted the letter and intent of Rule 56, denied the Baldassins a trial on the 
merits of their claims, and its ruling constitutes reversible error. 
Dr. Freeman's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment ("Memo, 
in Support") sets forth certain factual allegations. See Memorandum in Support, pp. 4-9; 
R. 122-127. Each of these allegations include excerpts from various depositions taken in this 
matter. See id. The Baldassins did not directly dispute these allegations, as the allegations 
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were simply excerpts from the depositions. Baldassins' Memorandum in Opposition to Dr. 
Freeman's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Memo, in Opp.") noted that, 
to the extent Defendants simply quote from various deposition transcripts, 
[Appellants] do not dispute that those people so testified.... However, Defendants do 
not cite all testimony relevant to the disposition of their motion. Therefore, 
[Appellants] have set forth the following Additional Material Facts. 
Memo, in Opp., pp. 3-4; R. 216-17. The Baldassins then submitted nine pages of additional 
material facts. Id., pp. 4-13; R. 217-26. These additional facts demonstrate that a dispute 
existed as to whether Dr. Freeman should be estopped from asserting the statute of 
limitations. See id. Specifically, these additional facts show that Dr. Freeman admitted 
liability for medical negligence to the Baldassins, that he would pay for the Baldassins' 
medical expenses and their lost wages, that he directed his malpractice insurer to make those 
payments, and then subsequently that, after the requisite statute of limitations had run, he and 
his insurer stopped making such payments and denied liability. Dr. Freeman did not address 
or attempt to dispute these additional facts. See Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment ("Reply Memo."), R. 297. 
The district court essentially ignored the Baldassins' factual allegations, based on the 
following analysis: 
In the Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Defendants complied with [Utah R. Civ. P. 7] in setting forth the Statement 
of Undisputed Facts. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition did not controvert any 
of Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts. Instead, Plaintiffs set forth a 
statement of Additional Material Facts as allowed by Rule 7. Because Defendants' 
Statement of Undisputed Facts were not controverted, they are deemed admitted for 
the purpose of this motion. Rule 7(c)(3)(A). Although Defendants did not controvert 
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the Additional Material Facts of Plaintiffs, Rule 7 is silent as to whether such 
statements are deemed admitted. 
Ruling, pp. 1-2; R. 351-52. 
The district court then set forth its analysis of the "Factual Background" of the case 
utilizing, with one exception, only Dr. Freeman's Statement of Facts. See id., pp. 2-3; R. 
352-53. Only one fact asserted by the Baldassins was set forth in this analysis. See id., p.3; 
R. 353. Because of the district court's failure to consider the Baldassins' additional material 
facts in its analysis, the district court concluded that the Baldassins had failed to fulfill, or 
raise genuine issues of material fact about, the first element of estoppel as a defense to the 
statute of limitations, that is, a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party 
inconsistent with the claim later asserted. See, Id., R.353. 
There is no legal basis on a motion for summary judgment for ignoring the facts 
asserted by the non-moving party and accepting only the facts asserted by the movant. 
Indeed, this is the antithesis of the proper analysis: 
It is not the purpose of the summary judgment procedure to judge the 
credibility of the averments of parties, or witnesses, or the weight of evidence. Neither 
is it to deny parties the right to a trial to resolve disputed issues of fact. Its purpose is 
to eliminate the time, trouble and expense of trial when upon any view taken of the 
facts as asserted by the party ruled against, he would not be entitled to prevail. Only 
when it so appears, is the court justified in refusing such a party the opportunity of 
presenting his evidence and attempting to persuade the fact trier to his views. 
Conversely, if there is any dispute as to any issue, material to the settlement of the 
controversy, the summary judgment should not be granted. 
Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975). Indeed, "it only takes one sworn 
statement under oath to dispute the averments on the other side of the controversy and create 
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an issue of fact," and it is improper for a district court to weigh the evidence before it or 
assess credibility. Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983). See Draper City v. 
Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1995) ("In granting summary judgment, it 
is apparent that the trial court gave more weight to some affidavits than to others. This was 
inappropriate at this stage of the litigation. On a motion for summary judgment, a trial court 
should not weigh disputed evidence, and its sole inquiry should be whether material issues 
of fact exist." (emphasis added)); Kilpatrickv. Wiley, Rain & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283,1292-
93 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (reversing summary judgment where u[t]he trial court improperly 
weighed evidence to reach its determination that material issues of fact surrounding causation 
were undisputed. The plaintiffs presented evidence that created genuine issues of material 
fact; therefore, the trial court inappropriately granted summary judgment.").1 
Moreover, there is nothing in Rule 7 that allows a district court to ignore "additional 
material facts": 
A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall contain a 
verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, and may 
contain a separate statement of additional facts in dispute. For each of the moving 
party's facts that is controverted, the opposing party shall provide an explanation of 
the grounds for any dispute, supported by citation to relevant materials, such as 
1
 The Baldassins submitted to the district court the Declaration of Rick Baldassin, which 
completely controverted deposition testimony by Dr. Freeman's insurance adjustor, Michael 
Imbler, that Mr. Imbler had discussed the medical malpractice statute of limitations with Rick 
Baldassin. This Declaration was attached, unsigned, to the Baldassins' Memorandum in 
Opposition, but the signed Declaration was filed with the court, and provided to opposing 
counsel, within four days of the Baldassins' Memorandum court filing. Mr. Baldassin's 
Declaration raises a clear issue of material fact with regard to reasonable reliance in the context 
of the elements of equitable estoppel. His Declaration is attached hereto in the Addendum at IV. 
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affidavits or discovery materials. For any additional facts set forth in the opposing 
memorandum, each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and supported by 
citation to supporting materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials, (emphasis 
added). 
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(B). The district court's Ruling renders this section a nullity; there 
would be no purpose to allow for "additional material facts" - facts that Dr. Freeman did not 
dispute in this case - if a district court could simply ignore the same. See Lyon v. Burton, 
2000 UT 19, \19, note 5, 5 P.3d 616 (Utah 2000) (stating courts' duty "to avoid interpreting 
a statute in a manner that renders portions of the statute, or related statutes, meaningless."). 
Rule 56(e) simply requires that, "[w]hen a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported...the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). The 
Baldassins made this showing with their additional material facts, and Rick's Declaration. 
Neither Rule 56(e) nor Rule 7 require more. 
Because the district court failed from the outset to apply the proper standard on Dr. 
Freeman's motion for summary judgment, its Ruling should be reversed. See Draper City, 
888 P.2d at 1101 (reversing summary judgment where trial court gave more weight to some 
affidavits than others, stating "[fjact-sensitive cases such as this case do not lend themselves 
to a determination on summary judgment."); Kilpatrick, 909 P.2d at 1293 (same); Pigs Gun 
Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County, 2002 UT 17, ^ f 24, 42 P.3d 379 (reversing summary judgment 
because "a trial court is not authorized to weigh facts in deciding a summary judgment 
motion, but is only to determine whether a dispute of material fact exists.... The trial court 
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did not follow this standard, and thus improperly concluded that no material issues of fact 
were disputed."). 
II. The Facts Presented to the District Court Show that Summary Judgment 
Was Improperly Granted. 
The issue in the underlying lawsuit in this appeal is whether the doctrine of estoppel 
should apply to prevent Dr. Freeman from asserting the statute of limitations. Estoppel to 
assert the statute of limitations is properly applied when a party "has been induced to refrain 
from using such means or taking such action as lay in his power, by which he might have 
retrieved his position and saved himself from loss." Rice v. Granite School Dist., 456 P.2d 
159, 162-63 (Utah 1969). The Baldassins' Memorandum in Opposition raised questions of 
material fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment and have the matter decided by a jury. 
The necessary elements of equitable estoppel are: 
(1) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim 
later asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken on the basis 
of the first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and (3) injury to the 
second party that would result from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate 
such statement, admission, act, or failure to act. 
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Kearl, 896 P.2d 644, 648 (Utah Ct. App.1995). Summary judgment is 
improper if the relevant facts relating to equitable estoppel are in dispute. See id. ("Because 
evidence properly before the trial court supports each of the elements of equitable estoppel, 
we find genuine issues of material fact, thereby precluding the entry of summary judgment 
against the intervenors."); United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 
880, 892 (Utah 1993) ("Once again, summary judgment was improperly granted because the 
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record does not reflect undisputed facts which would support the invocation of waiver or 
estoppel."). In addition, reliance is a question of fact: 
[W]hile Travelers has argued that Mr. Kearl's conduct could not equate to reasonable 
reliance, that question is one of fact to be determined at trial. See Berkeley Bank for 
Coops, v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798, 801 (Utah mO);Conderv. Williams &Assocs., 739 
P.2d 634, 638 (Utah App.1987). We therefore reverse the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment against the intervenors and remand for further proceedings on the 
issues pertaining to equitable estoppel. The issue of actual reliance and the 
reasonableness of the reliance is, of course, for the jury to determine. Berkeley Bank 
for Cooperatives v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798, 801 (Utah 1980). 
Travelers Ins. Co., 896 P.2d at 648. 
Utah law holds that waiver or estoppel "may be found in the face of a mandatory 
statute. For instance, statutes of limitation ordinarily are mandatory both in form and effect. 
Nevertheless, they may be waived or the party may be estopped from relying upon them." 
Ricev. Granite School Dist., 456 P.2d 159(Utah 1969). The basis for this determination was 
set forth therein: 
Where, as here, the delay in commencing action was induced by the conduct 
of the party sought to be charged the latter may not invoke such conduct to defeat 
recovery. An estoppel may arise although there was no designed fraud on the part of 
the person sought to be estopped. To create an equitable estoppel, it is enough if the 
party has been induced to refrain from using such means or taking such action as lay 
in his power, by which he might have retrieved his position and saved himself from 
loss. It is well settled that a person by his conduct may be estopped to rely upon these 
defenses. Where the delay in commencing action is induced by the conduct of the 
defendant it cannot be availed of by him as a defense. 
Id. at 162-63 (quotations and citations omitted). 
In Rice, the Utah Supreme Court specifically addressed whether negotiations for the 
compromise of a claim or debt will give rise to an estoppel against pleading the statute of 
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limitations. Id. at 163. The Court stated that the determination "depends upon the character 
of the negotiations and the circumstances surrounding the parties." Id. There, the facts 
indicated that estoppel should apply: 
In the instant action, the facts, as asserted in plaintiffs affidavit, 
indicate that the adjuster for the insurance carrier admitted liability and 
promised compensation upon several occasions. Plaintiff was led to believe 
that the only unresolved issue was the ascertainment of her damages, which 
she was informed was contingent solely on her discharge by her doctor. If the 
facts be substantiated in plaintiffs affidavit, the trier of fact could reasonably 
conclude that the conduct of the adjuster was such as to induce plaintiff to 
delay filing her action. 
Where the delay in commencing an action is induced by the conduct of the 
defendant, or his privies, or an insurance adjuster acting in his behalf, it cannot 
be availed of by any of them as a defense. 
One cannot justly or equitably lull an adversary into a false sense of security 
thereby subjecting his claim to the bar of limitations, and then be heard to 
plead that very delay as a defense to the action when brought. Acts or conduct 
which wrongfully induce a party to believe an amicable adjustment of his 
claim will be made may create an estoppel against pleading the Statute of 
Limitations. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
InHartv. Bridges, 591 P.2d 1172(Okl. 1979), the Oklahoma Supreme Court applied 
this same analysis to a personal injury claimant who wished to amend his complaint to 
include the allegation that promises to settle by an insurer estopped the defendant from taking 
advantage of the statute of limitations. Plaintiff alleged that the defendant's representative 
"continually admitted liability to plaintiffs attorney after, as well as before the action was 
filed," and that "defendant's insurance carrier promised it would pay plaintiffs claim as soon 
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as his damages were determined." Id. at 1174. The court reversed a trial court's refusal to 
allow the amendment. 
These allegations properly pleaded would be sufficient to raise a fact question as to 
whether promises to settle by insurer estop defendant from taking advantage of the 
statute of limitations. Mere negotiations of course do not make out a case for estoppel. 
Plaintiff must show he relied on the settlement negotiations and that such reliance was 
reasonable under the facts of this case, thus inducing him to delay filing suit. One 
cannot equitably lull an adversary into a false sense of security, thereby subjecting his 
claim lo the bar of limitations and then be heard to plead that very delay as a defense 
to the action. Further, where negotiations are conducted by an agent of the defendant, 
including a representative of defendant's insurer, negotiations and conduct of the 
agent are binding on defendant. 
We hold plaintiff should be permitted to amend his petition to allege an estoppel of 
defendant to plead the statute of limitations and it was error for trial court to refuse 
his request.... It is not necessary to prove defendant intentionally misled plaintiff or 
even intended by his conduct to induce delay. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
Indeed, a multitude of state supreme and appellate courts have held that, where 
plaintiff has alleged an insurer's promise to pay or similar conduct, summary judgment was 
improper on the issue of estoppel to assert the relevant statute of limitations. See Mandola 
v. Mariotti, 557 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Ct App.- Houston 1977) (reversing summary judgment 
on statute of limitations claim because material fact existed as to whether insurer's claim 
adjuster had told personal injury plaintiff that insurer would take care of all damages); 
Sander v. Wright, 394 N.W.2d 896 (S.D. 1986) (reversing summary judgment because issue 
of fact existed as to whether conduct of driver's insurance adjuster estopped driver from 
asserting statute of limitations); Gagner v. Strekouras, 423 A.2d 1168 (R.I. 1980) (summary 
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judgment relying on statute of limitations reversed where personal injury plaintiff alleged that 
insurer had assured him that a settlement would be reached); Zaayer v. Edwards, 429 N.E.2d 
607 (111. App. Ct. 1981) (dismissal of complaint due to statute of limitations reversed where 
plaintiff raised factual issue regarding conduct of defendant's insurance agent, including 
advising plaintiff to send all bills and discussing possibility of settlement). 
These authorities were cited below. See Memo, in Opp., pp. 11-15; R. 224-28. 
However, with little analysis, the district court quickly dismissed them: 
Plaintiffs rely on Rice v. Granite School District, 456 P.2d 159 (Utah 1989) 
[sic] and Whitaker v. Salt Lake City Corp., 552 P.2d 1252 (Utah 1974). 
However, in both of those cases, insurance adjusters had promised and assured 
plaintiffs that they would be compensated for their injuries. As such, Rice and 
Whitaker do not help Plaintiffs. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not and cannot 
meet the first element of estoppel. 
Ruling, p.3;R. 353. 
This Ruling is insufficient to grant summary judgment. The district court fails to 
explain why "Rice and Whitaker do not help Plaintiffs,"2 and provides no analysis to justify 
its determination.3 
2
 The citation recited by the district court, 552 P.2d 1252, reveals a Wyoming case 
styled Rodarte v. City ofRiverton, 552 P.2d 1245 (Wyo. 1976). The correct citation is 
522 P.2d 1252 (Utah 1974). This case was not cited in the Baldassins' Memorandum in 
Opposition. In any event, in Whitaker, the Utah Supreme Court held that whether a party 
was estopped to assert the defense of the running of the statute of limitations was a 
question of fact, precluding summary judgment. See Whitaker v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
522P.2datl253. 
3
 The district court, at oral argument, also indicated that it would not be persuaded by 
non-Utah cases because they "they all come from states where we don't usually follow -1 mean, 
Texas and Rhode Island and South Dakota and Oklahoma." See, April 11, 2008 hearing 
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As set forth in the fact section of the Baldassins' Memorandum in Opposition, each 
of the elements of estoppel are present in this case; at the very least questions of fact exist, 
rendering summary judgment on this issue improper. Dr. Freeman and his insurance 
adjustor, Mr. Imbler, made statements and/or admissions that Dr. Freeman had made a 
medical mistake, and because of that mistake, they would pay Rick's bills and related 
expenses. See Memo, in Opp., pp. 4-9; R. 217-22. Mr. Imbler never discussed with Rick the 
requisite statute of limitations deadlines. See, Declaration of Rick Baldassin, R.293. These 
actions and omissions are inconsistent with later claims that Dr. Freeman, or his insurance 
company, would not make such payments, and would instead assert that the statute of 
limitations bars the Baldassins' claims. See id., p. 10; R. 223. Rick did just as Dr. Freeman 
told him; he supplied his medical bills and related expenses, including lost income, to Dr. 
Freeman and his insurance agent. For a period of time, these bills were paid, and Rick did 
not institute a suit against Dr. Freeman. See id., pp. 7-10; R. 220-23. However, when the 
statute of limitations lapsed, these payments ceased. See id. Rick was injured when Dr. 
Freeman and his insurer changed course and refused to pay Rick for expenses incurred as a 
result of Dr. Freeman's admitted negligence. See id. Rick was further injured when Dr. 
Freeman asserted the statute of limitations as a defense. 
Contrary to the cursory analysis of the district court, Rice and Travelers Ins. Co., 
along with the additional authorities cited herein, make clear that a claim for estoppel arises 
transcript at 29-30; R.381. 
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in such circumstances. See Rice, 456 P.2d at 163 ("One cannot justly or equitably lull an 
adversary into a false sense of security thereby subjecting his claim to the bar of limitations, 
and then be heard to plead that very delay as a defense to the action when brought. Acts or 
conduct which wrongfully induce a party to believe an amicable adjustment of his claim will 
be made may create an estoppel against pleading the Statute of Limitations."); Travelers Ins. 
Co., 896 P.2d at 648 ("while Travelers has argued that Mr. Kearl's conduct could not equate 
to reasonable reliance, that question is one of fact to be determined at trial."). At a 
minimum, the Baldassins raised a question of material fact, rendering summary judgment 
improper. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56. 
The district court's analysis regarding the second element of estoppel, reasonable 
action or inaction, is flawed because it relies entirely on Dr. Freeman's statement of facts, 
once again ignoring the facts presented by the Baldassins: 
In this case, rather than showing they failed to act on the basis of Dr. 
Freeman's conduct, Plaintiffs stated that Dr. Freeman and other told them to 
sue him and that the reason they did not sue him was because it would hurt 
their high-end piano business if they sued a doctor. Although Plaintiffs now 
allege that they relied on Dr. Freeman's conduct, the undisputed evidence is 
to the contrary. 
Ruling, p.4; R. 354. 
This analysis ignores entirely the Baldassins' "Additional Material Facts," specifically 
paragraphs 6 through 17, which describe in detail how Rick was led to believe his bills and 
expenses would be taken care of, only to have this promise broken once the statute of 
limitations expired. See Memo, in Opp., pp. 4-10; R. 217-23. As set forth above, it is 
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reversible error to "give more weight to some affidavits than others," Draper City, 888 P.2d 
at 1101, or "to weigh facts in deciding a summary judgment motion." Pigs Gun Club, Inc. 
v. Sanpete County, 2002 UT 17, f 24, 42 P.3d 379. This is particularly true regarding an 
issue as fact dependent as reasonable reliance. See Travelers Ins. Co., 896 P.2d at 648. 
Because the district court chose to consider only Dr. Freeman's factual allegations and 
ignored the Baldassins' allegations, the Baldassins respectfully request that this Court reverse 
the district court's decision granting summary judgment and remand this matter for trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court erred when it granted Dr. Freeman's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The district court failed to liberally construe the facts in favor of the Baldassins, 
which facts reflect that Dr. Freeman admitted liabilty for medical negligence to the 
Baldassins; admitted that he should pay for the Baldassins' medical expenses and lost wages 
the Baldassins incurred as a result of Dr. Freeman's medical negligence; directed his 
malpractice insurer to make these payments, which were made until after the statute of 
limitations had run; and then reversed course and denied liability and refused to make any 
further payments for medical expenses and lost wages to the Baldassins. The facts before the 
district court further raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Baldassins 
reasonably relied upon Dr. Freeman's earlier actions and statements, and those of his 
malpractice insurer, in not bringing a lawsuit until after Dr. Freeman and his malpractice 
insurer reversed course and the statute of limitations for a medical malpractice action had 
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run. 
Accordingly, genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment exist as 
to whether Dr. Freeman should be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations. The 
Baldassins request that this Court reverse the district court's order granting summary 
judgment and allow the Baldassins to present their case to a jury. 
DATED this X\ day of August, 2008 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
Jeffrey 
Bradley My^rastetterg 
Kay Burningham, Attorney at Law 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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Rule 6 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Note 20 
60(b), (1), 73(a) Anderson v Anderson, 1955, 3 
Utah 2d 277, 282 P 2d 845. Appeal And Error 
<3=> 430(2) 
PART III. PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS 
RULE 7. PLEADINGS ALLOWED; MOTIONS, MEMORANDA, HEAR-
INGS, ORDERS, OBJECTION TO COMMISSIONER'S ORDER 
(a) Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a 
counterclaim; an answer to a cross claim, if the answer contains a cross claim; 
a third party complaint, if a person who was not an original party is summoned 
under the provisions of Rule 14; and a third party answer, if a third party 
complaint is served. No other pleading shall be allowed, except that the court 
may order a reply to an answer or a third party answer. 
(b)(1) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall be by motion 
which, unless made during a hearing or trial or in proceedings before a court 
commissioner, shall be made in accordance with this rule. A motion shall be 
in writing and state succinctly and with particularity the relief sought and the 
grounds for the relief sought. 
(b)(2) Limit on order to show cause. An application to the court for an order 
to show cause shall be made only for enforcement of an existing order or for 
sanctions for violating an existing order. An application for an order to show 
cause must be supported by an affidavit sufficient to show cause to believe a 
party has violated a court order. 
(c) Memoranda. 
(c)(1) Memoranda required, exceptions, filing times. All motions, except un-
contested or ex parte motions, shall be accompanied by a supporting memoran-
dum. Within ten days after service of the motion and supporting memoran-
dum, a party opposing the motion shall file a memorandum in opposition. 
Within five days after service of the memorandum in opposition, the moving 
party may file a reply memorandum, which shall be limited to rebuttal of 
matters raised in the memorandum in opposition. No other memoranda will 
be considered without leave of court. A party may attach a proposed order to 
its initial memorandum. 
(c)(2) Length. Initial memoranda shall not exceed 10 pages of argument 
without leave of the court. Reply memoranda shall not exceed 5 pages of 
argument without leave of the court. The court may permit a party to file an 
over-length memorandum upon ex parte application and a showing of good 
cause. 
(c)(3) Content. 
(c)(3)(A) A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall 
contain a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends no 
genuine issue exists. Each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and 
supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery 
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materials. Each fact set forth in the moving party's memorandum is deemed 
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless controverted by the 
responding party. 
(c)(3)(B) A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall 
contain a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is 
controverted, and may contain a separate statement of additional facts in 
dispute. For each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, the opposing 
party shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any dispute, supported by 
citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. For 
any additional facts set forth in the opposing memorandum, each fact shall be 
separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to supporting mate-
rials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. 
(c)(3)(C) A memorandum with more than 10 pages of argument shall contain 
a table of contents and a table of authorities with page references. 
(c)(3)(D) A party may attach as exhibits to a memorandum relevant portions 
of documents cited in the memorandum, such as affidavits or discovery materi-
als. 
(d) Request to submit for decision. When briefing is complete, either party 
may file a "Request to Submit for Decision." The request to submit for decision 
shall state the date on which the motion was served, the date the opposing 
memorandum, if any, was served, the date the reply memorandum, if any, was 
served, and whether a hearing has been requested. If no party files a request, 
the motion will not be submitted for decision. 
(e) Hearings. The court may hold a hearing on any motion. A party may 
request a hearing in the motion, in a memorandum or in the request to submit 
for decision. A request for hearing shall be separately identified in the caption 
of the document containing the request. The court shall grant a request for a 
hearing on a motion under Rule 56 or a motion that would dispose of the 
action or any claim or defense in the action unless the court finds that the 
motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or the issue has been authorita-
tively decided. 
(f) Orders. 
(f)(1) An order includes every direction of the court, including a minute order 
entered in writing, not included in a judgment. An order for the payment of 
money may be enforced in the same manner as if it were a judgment. Except 
as otherwise provided by these rules, any order made without notice to the 
adverse party may be vacated or modified by the judge who made it with or 
without notice. Orders shall state whether they are entered upon trial, stipula-
tion, motion or the court's initiative. 
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial 
memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party 
shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the other parties 
a proposed order in conformity with the court's decision. Objections to the 
proposed order shall be filed within five days after service. The party prepar-
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ing the order shall file the proposed order upon being served with an objection 
or upon expiration of the time to object 
(f)(3) Unless otherwise directed by the court, all orders shall be prepared as 
separate documents and shall not incorporate any matter by reference 
(g) Objection to court commissioner's recommendation. A recommendation 
of a court commissioner is the order of the court until modified by the court A 
party may object to the recommendation by filing an objection in the same 
manner as filing a motion withm ten days after the recommendation is made in 
open court or if the court commissioner takes the matter under advisement, 
ten days after the minute entry of the recommendation is served A party may 
respond to the objection in the same manner as responding to a motion 
[Amended effective November 1, 2003, April 1 2004, November 1 2005, April 1, 
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IDGMENT Rule 56 
f ^cel from the trial is sustained, it is not 
'"'to also'order a new trial without request 
£-'"for since another decree could not be en-
a ^Jthout a new trial. Thomas v. Morris, 
[§2 8 Utah 284, 31 P. 446. Judgment <£=> 164 
^proceedings
 after opening default, open-
Eft ing or setting aside default judgment 
laternity action was remanded for an eviden-
.hearing on damages, at which hearing 
Imitative father, whose motion to set aside the 
plSJwilt judgment entered against him was de-
itied was entitled to appear and defend with 
counsel, since the amount of damages requested 
neither a sum certain nor a sum readily 
.jculable, and trial court had not taken evi-
lifence as to the reasonableness of the amount 
*fore. entering default judgment against puta-
* 'father.' Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 55(b)(2), 
j ^ J -La r sen v. Collina, 1984, 684 P.2d 52. 
Ildren Out-of-wedlock <S=> 73 
IVVhere a default judgment is expunged for 
' ~ jflidity. for failure to verify the complaint, 
Jntiff may, on notice to defendant, be permit-
to amenci the complaint by adding the verifi-
Bton. -Franklin v. Thatcher, 1919, 53 Utah 
$7<f178 P/922. Judgment <&> 176 
^Review/opening or setting aside default 
|V£>j judgment 
il,'court's ruling on motion to set aside 
aiilt involves trial court's discretionary pow-
,'atid1 Court of Appeals will not disturb trial -
irVs decision in such matters absent clear 
of, discretion. Miller v. Brocksmith, 
Mtef'825.P.*2d 690. Appeal And Error <£=> 
P57(l)f Judgments 139 '" ; 
%\ is largely within the discretion of the trial 
fCfcourt to set aside a judgment which has been 
^entered on a party's default and, while this 
Indiscretion should be liberally exercised in favor 
" £,the a defaulting party, decision of the trial 
)irt will not be reversed on appeal in absence 
of a clear abuse of discretion. Rules Civ.Proc, 
Rule 60(b). Pitman v. Bonham, 1984, 677 P.2d 
1126. Appeal And Error @=> 957(1); Judgment 
<3=>139 
Trial court has considerable discretion in rul-
ing on motion to set aside default judgment and 
Supreme Court will reverse trial court only 
where clear abuse of discretion is shown. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 60(b). Gardiner and 
Gardiner Builders v. Swapp, 1982, 656 P.2d 
429. Appeal And Error <3> 957(1); Judgment 
<3=> 139 
Whether a trial court should set aside a de-
fault judgment is largely a discretionary matter, 
and appellate court will reverse court's ruling 
only if it is clear the court abused that discre-
tion. Heath v. Mower, 1979, 597 P.2d 855. 
Appeal And Error <$=* 957(1); Judgment <$=> 139 
Trial court has a discretion in determining 
whether to set aside a default judgment, and 
determination should only be reversed for an 
abuse of discretion that is arbitrary, capricious, 
or not based on adequate findings of fact or on 
law. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 60(b). Pa-
cer Sport & Cycle, Inc. v. Myers, 1975, 534 P.2d 
616. Appeal And Error <£=> 957(1); Judgment 
<£=> 139 
Whether default judgment should be relieved 
lies within discretion of trial court and its dis-
cretion^ will riot be disturbed unless there is a 
patent abuse thereof. Board of Ed. of Granite 
School Dist. v. Cox, 1963,. 14 Utah 2d 385, 384 
P.2d 806. Appeal And Error <s> 957(1); Judg-
ment ®=» 139 
Relief from default judgment on grounds of 
inadvertence and excusable neglect is discre-
tionary, and in absence of a clear abuse of 
discretion trial court will not be reversed. 
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 60(b). Masters v. 
LeSeuer, 1962, 13 Utah 2d 293, 373 P.2d 573. 
Appeal And Error <3=* 957(2); Judgment <2=> 139 
P U L E 56. SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
|a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
s-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
piration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a 
jgQtion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary 
pigment upon all or any part thereof. 
.$&' ^ o r defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
IprQss-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
pve for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
fclcj Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits 
IB?" °e in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if 
p , Pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
f tner with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
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material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the 
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of 
damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 1 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy } , 
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall 
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial 
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action 
as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed 
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Suppor t ing! 
and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that 
the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or J 
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be S 
attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to bef* 
supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as] 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations .^  
or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise M 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a | 
genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered " 
against a party failing to file such a response. '1 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a Jj 
party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by J 
affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the ~? 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such |£ 
other order as is just. '& 
'-'r 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant \', 
to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the .:K 
court shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party ^f 
the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, v 
including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may .^  
be adjudged guilty of contempt. ;4 
[Amended effective November 1, 1997; November 1, 2004.] 
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K'VI.' REVIEW 191-240 
In general 1-40 
Absence of issue of fact, fact questions 42 
Abuse of discretion standard, standards, scope 
and extent of review 200.5 
Actions in which summary judgment is author-
> ized 2 
Adequacy of briefs 197.5 
Admissibility of evidence, motion and proceed-
ings 100 
Affidavits 131-160 
Ambiguity in written instructions, fact ques-
«tions 45 
ippealable judgments 214 
Attorneys, fact questions 46 
«*r of limitation of actions, grounds for sum-
mary judgment 5 
fonds, fact questions 47 
'ertiorari, review 198 
Conclusiveness of adjudication, motion and 
proceedings 106 
onstruction and operation 11 
ontracts, fact questions 48 
onversion of motion to dismiss to one for 
summary judgment, motion and proceedings 
Conversion of motion to dismiss to summary 
judgment motion, review 194 
Correctness of conclusions of law, generally, 
standards, scope and extent of review 202 
Correctness without deference to trial court 
conclusions of law, standards, scope and ex-
tent of review 203 
Cross motions, motion and proceedings 93 
Cross motions, partial summary judgment 163 
Defects and objections 10 
Determination as question of law, standards, 
scope and extent of review 208 
Discovery and continuance for discovery, mo-
tion and proceedings 96 
Discovery and continuance for discovery, par-
tial summary judgment 164 
Discretion of lower court, review 199 
Divorce and separation, fact questions 49 
Documentary evidence or official record, mo-
tion and proceedings 101 
Effect of counterclaim, grounds for summary 
judgment 6 
Employment, fact questions 50 
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JAN S. FREEMAN, M.D. and JAN S. 
FREEMAN, M.D., P.C. 
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1 RULING ON DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 060700579 
Judge Thomas L. Kay 
This case is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment heard on April 11, 2008. Jeffrey R. Oritt appeared for Plaintiffs and 
Scott A. Dubois appeared for Defendants. Following a thorough review of the 
pleadings relating to this motion, and the arguments of counsel, and good cause 
appearing, the Court now issues its ruling. 
I. Factual Background 
In the Memorandum in Support of Defendants'Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Defendants complied with Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
in setting forth the Statement of Undisputed Facts. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in 
Opposition did not controvert any of Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts. 
Instead, Plaintiffs set forth a statement of Additional Material Facts as allowed by 
Rule 7. Because Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts were not 
controverted, they are deemed admitted for the purpose of this motion. Rule 7 
(c)(3)(A). Although Defendants did not controvert the Additional Material Facts 
of Plaintiffs, Rule 7 is silent as to whether such statements are deemed admitted. 
Ruling on defendants' mot ion for summary judgment 
VD24261787 
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The incontroverted facts from Defendants' memorandum show that 
following a surgical hernia repair on May 16, 2003, Rick Baldassin was told that 
there had been an accident and that he was being transferred to the LDS Hospital. 
(Para. 3). That same day, Dr. Freeman told Plaintiff and his wife that he had 
nicked plaintiffs colon. (Para. 4-5). Sometime between May 22, 2003 and May 
28, 2003, Dr. Freeman asked Plaintiff to collect the bills and bring them to him so 
that he could take care of them. (Para. 10). 
In his discussions with Plaintiff, Dr. Freeman never agreed to pay any 
specific sum of money or to make payments for a specific amount of time, nor did 
he ever offer to pay medical bills in exchange for an agreement not to sue him. 
(Para. 11). Plaintiff believed that Dr. Freeman had been negligent in his treatment 
of Plaintiff while he was in the hospital in May of 2003. (Para. 13). On May 22, 
2003, Dr. Freeman told Plaintiffs wife that "you need to sue me" in reference to 
Plaintiffs medical situation. Dr. Freeman frequently told the Plaintiffs that they 
needed to sue him. However, plaintiffs did not think it was appropriate to sue Dr. 
Freeman. (Para. 14). While Plaintiff was in the hospital in 2003, he and his wife 
were repeatedly told by others, in addition to Dr. Freeman, that they had an 
actionable lawsuit. (Para. 15). When Plaintiffs' wife told Dr. Freeman that others 
had said that they should sue him, Dr. Freeman responded, "you're right." (Para. 
16). The Plaintiffs never told Dr. Freeman that they would not file a lawsuit 
against him, nor did Dr. Freeman ever ask them to sign any kind of release of 
liability. (Para. 17). 
In an attempt to coordinate payment of certain of Plaintiff s medical bills, 
Dr. Freeman referred Plaintiff to Mike Imbler, a representative of Dr. Freeman's 
insurance earner. (Para. 19). Plaintiff had no agreement with Mr. Imbler that he 
would be paid in exchange for a promise not to sue Dr. Freeman, nor did Mr. 
Imbler ever agree that Plaintiff would be paid a specific amount for medical costs 
or other costs. (Para 21). In Mr. Imbler's first meeting with the Plaintiffs, on 
September 15, 2003, Mr. Imbler obtained Plaintiffs authorization to release 
medical records. At that time, he also explained to Plaintiffs that the statute of 
limitations is two years where they would have to either perfect their claim or file 
a lawsuit against Dr. Freeman if the claim was not settled by then. (Para 22). In 
response, Plaintiffs wife said that they couldn't file a lawsuit against a physician 
because that would not be good for their business. (Para. 23). Dr. Freeman's 
insurance carrier made no payments for any amounts after February 2005. (Para. 
26). 
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The Additional Material Facts from Plaintiffs' Memorandum show that in a 
conversation one year after the original surgery Dr. Freeman told Plaintiff, "Yeah, 
you have a heck of a scar for a hernia. And then he said, I've been doing this for 
thirty years. I should have known better." (Para. 9). 
II. Legal Analysis 
In order to establish estoppel as a defense to the statute of limitations, a 
party must prove each of the following elements: 
1. A statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a 
claim later asserted; 
2. Reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken on the basis of the first 
party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and 
3. Injury to the second party that would result from allowing the first party to 
contradict or repudiate the statement, admission, act, or failure to act. 
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Kearl. 896 P2d 644, 647 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
Defendants contend that the undisputed facts show that Plaintiffs cannot 
establish either of the first two elements of estoppel. As to the first element, the 
undisputed facts are that Defendants paid for two sets of bills, that Dr. Freeman 
told plaintiffs (1) that he nicked the colon, (2) that he should have known better, 
and (3) that they should sue him. 
None of these acts or statements is inconsistent with Dr. Freeman asserting 
the statute of limitations in this case. Indeed, telling the Plaintiffs that they should 
sue him is consistent, not inconsistent, with asserting the statute of limitations. 
These acts or statements did not contain an admission and made no promise to 
pay. See McKinnon v. Tambrands, Inc., 815 F. Supp. 415 (D. Utah 1993). 
Plaintiffs rely on Rice v. Granite School District 456 P.2d 159 (Utah 1989) 
and Whitaker v. Salt Lake City Corp., 552 P.2d 1252 (Utah 1974). However, in 
both of those cases, insurance adjustors had promised and assured plaintiffs that 
they would be compensated for their injuries. As such, Rice and Whitaker do not 
help Plaintiffs. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not and cannot meet the first element 
of estoppel. 
Because the first element has not been met, Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment is granted for Plaintiffs' failure to establish the first element 
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of estoppel. As an additional and alternative ground in granting Defenants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court will address the second element. 
As to this second element, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that there 
must be proof of "reasonable action of inaction by the [party claiming estoppel] 
taken or not taken on the basis of the [opposing] party's statement, admission, act, 
or failure to act." CECO v. Concrete Specialists. Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969 (Utah 
1989). Or as Judge Winder stated in McKinnon, "In other words, the party 
claiming estoppel must show (1) that it acted or failed to act con the basis' of the 
opposing party's conduct, and (2) that its action or inaction was reasonable under 
the circumstances." 
In this case, rather than showing they failed to act on the basis of Dr. 
Freeman's conduct, Plaintiffs stated that Dr. Freeman and others told them to sue 
him and that the reason they did not sue him was because it would hurt their high-
end piano business if they sued a doctor. Although Plaintiffs now allege that they 
relied on Dr. Freeman's conduct, the undisputed evidence is to the contrary. 
Accordingly, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted for Plaintiffs' 
failure to establish the second element of estoppel. 
Plaintiffs cite cases from other jurisdictions to argue that summary judgment 
should be denied. None of these cases are controlling nor helpful because of their 
different factual settings. However, one of the principles from these cases is that 
"settlement negotiations can bring on an estoppel if they are accompanied by 
certain statements or conduct calculated to lull the claimant into a reasonable 
belief that his claim will be settled without suit." Gagner v. Strekouras, 423 A.2d 
1168 (R.I. 1980). Or as stated in Hart v. Bridges. 591 P.2d 1172 (Okla. 1979), 
"One cannot equitably lull an adversary into a false sense of security, thereby 
subjecting his claim to the bar of limitations and then be heard to plead that very 
delay as a defense to the action." These cases do not help Plaintiffs. Rather than 
lulling them into a false sense of security, Dr. Freeman told Plaintiffs to sue him. 
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III. Conclusion 
Based upon the foregoing, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is 
granted. 
Dated this 2 ^ day of April, 2008. 
BY THE COURT: 
<dumi^^^ 
Thomas L. Kay 
District Judge 
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JAN S FREEMAN, M.D., individually, JAN 
S. FREEMAN, M.D., P.C., a Utah 
professional corporation, and DOES 1-20, 1 
Defendants. 
DECLARATION OF 
1 RICK BALDASSIN 
Case No. 060604224 
Judge Thomas L. Kay 
I, Rick Baldassin, hereby declare as follows: 
1. I am over 18 years of age and am competent to testify in a court of law. 
2. I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein. 
3. When my deposition was taken in this litigation on August 14-15, 2007,1 was 
asked about conversations that I had with Mike Imbler of UMIA. I was not asked, during that 
questioning, whether Mr. Imbler discussed with me the statute of limitations for me to file a 
medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Freeman, or statutes of limitation in general. 
4. At no time during any discussions I had at any time with Mr. Imbler did Mr. 
Imbler discuss with me anything about a statute of limitations deadline concerning my filing a 
lawsuit against Dr. Freeman or when I would have to perfect my claim against Dr. Freeman if 
things were not resolved with UMIA by a certain time. 
5. During my initial discussion with Mr. Imbler, I asked him how long, once I 
provided documentation to him of medical out of pocket expenses and lost wages, it usually took 
for those expenses and claims to be paid by UMIA. I never asked him how long I had to pursue 
legal action against Dr. Freeman in any manner. 
I declare, under criminal penalty of the State of Utah, that the foregoing is true and 
correct, 
DATED this 6 ^ day of February, 2008. 
rack Baldassin 
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